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NAZI-SOVIET DOCUMENTS AROUSE WIDESPREAD DISCUSSION

THE publication by the Department of State on January 21 of captured Nazi documents covering German-Russian relations from April 17, 1939 to June 22, 1941,* when Germany invaded Russia, has been accompanied by unusual publicity both at home and, through the Voice of America, also abroad. This publicity, intended to underline the significance of the mutual concessions made by Germany and Russia just before the outbreak of World War II and during its first two years, conveys the impression that the Nazi documents reveal sensational information previously unknown to the Western powers. Except for some highly interesting details, however, the basic facts concerning the German-Russian understanding of 1939 and its subsequent evolution in the course of the first two years of war were known at the time to American students of international affairs,** and must have been learned, as the events unfolded, in the foreign offices of London, Paris and Washington. Under these circumstances, the opening of the Nazi archives in 1945 must have merely produced confirmation of long familiar facts—not, as the atmosphere created around the publication of the documents would seem to indicate, the shock of complete surprise.

WHY PUBLICATION NOW? Actually, according to the preface to this volume, the Department of State and the British Foreign Office, in June 1946, "agreed to sponsor jointly the publication of approximately twenty volumes of documents illustrative of German foreign policy from 1918 to 1945"—an agreement to which the French govern-

ment subsequently became a party. Each government, however, reserved the right to publish separately any portion of the documents. It is reported from Washington that late in the spring or early in the summer of 1947 the State Department decided to publish the Nazi-Soviet documents first. During the debates of the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1947, Britain, following Vishinsky's violent denunciations of "imperialism" and "war-mongering" on the part of the British and American governments, indicated that it might reveal information unfavorable to the Kremlin which it had obtained from official German sources. The publication of the Nazi-Soviet documents at this time by Washington is regarded as a direct answer to Moscow's charges of Western "imperialism" and "aggression," by demonstrating that it was Russia, not the United States or Britain, which pursued a course of "imperialistic expansion" by occupying eastern Poland, the Baltic states and Bessarabia in 1939-40, with the acquiescence of Hitler, and subsequently demanding a sphere of influence in the Balkans. The documents have also been cited in support of the contention that Russia's decision to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939 made it possible for Hitler to attack Poland, and that therefore the Soviet government was directly responsible for the outbreak of World War II.

REST OF STORY SHOULD BE TOLD. It is entirely understandable that the United States, goaded by Moscow's accusations, should want to make a public retort and point out those actions of the Soviet government which clearly do not conform with the assertions of Soviet leaders that they alone opposed German nazism. From the point of view of the contemporary historian, however, it would have been wiser if the State Department had adhered to

*Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, ed. by Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), Department of State Publication 3023.

**See V. M. Dean, "Russia and the 'New Order' in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 15, 1940; and "The U.S.S.R. and Post-War Europe," *ibid.*, August 15, 1943.

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the original intention of publishing the entire series of German documents from 1918 to 1945. Publication of the Nazi-Soviet documents without any attempt to give the context of other events of the interwar years gives a distorted picture of that period. It also constitutes an invitation to the Soviet government to publish, in turn, such official information as it possesses concerning the record of the Western powers and of some Eastern European countries.

This record, already familiar to Western historians, could include the role played by the Western powers in the Spanish civil war; the negotiations initiated by Hitler in the early years of his regime with the then strongly anti-Russian government of Poland, intended to enlist Polish support for an eventual German invasion of Russia; German solicitation of anti-Russian aid by the Baltic states and Finland; anti-Russian activities of various kinds by the pre-war governments of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. It would include, too, repeated attempts by Britain to achieve a *modus vivendi* with Hitler, even when this involved acquiescence in Hitler's occupation of Austria and the surrender by Britain and France of Czech territory at Munich in 1938; failure on the part of Britain, France and the United States to prevent Germany's eastward expansion in 1938-1939, and the frequently expressed hope in the West that nazism and communism would destroy each other, leaving the Western world unscathed. The Russian record might point out that the United States continued to ship materials useful for war purposes to Japan, then engaged in fighting China—which was no worse, but hardly better, than Russian shipment of raw materials to Germany in

1939-1941. It could bring its account to a climax by recalling the abortive attempts half-heartedly undertaken by Britain and France in the spring of 1939 to reach a military agreement with Russia only after Hitler's absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, but even then without "political" commitments on the part of the Western powers; and the lack of any assistance by the United States to Poland when that country was finally invaded by Germany in September 1939. The Soviet government might also counter the American charge that Russia did not oppose Germany until it was itself attacked on June 22, 1941 by pointing out that, except for lend-lease aid to Britain, the United States did not oppose Germany in Europe, and entered World War II actively only after it had been attacked by Japan at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The story of the interwar years and of World War II is not a pretty story, whichever side tells it. Neither was the story of World War I, as told in the secret treaties of that time which, it will now be recalled not without irony, the Soviet government published in 1917 when, upon coming to power, it opened the archives of the Tsarist foreign office. But the history of the past thirty years, however unsavory it may seem to us, is the background of the Nazi-Soviet documents, and must be borne in mind in analyzing these documents. In presenting to the world its case against Russia the United States will be in a much stronger position when it has published, at least in summary form, the whole story of 1918-1945, and not only the part regarded as unfavorable to the Soviet government.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first of three articles on the Nazi-Soviet documents.)

BRITAIN BASES NEW FOREIGN POLICY ON WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's announcement on January 22 that London will seek to form a Western European Union is a definite turning away from historic principles of Britain's policy abroad. No longer will Britain pursue the balance of power on the continent but will attempt to form a union of Western countries in which each will retain its independence. As a first step toward union several nations will be asked to conclude treaties comparable to the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk of March 4, 1947. This alliance provides for mutual military defense and economic cooperation. The Benelux countries—Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—have, in fact, already been asked to frame similar bilateral pacts with London and Paris. Later Portugal, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and perhaps Switzerland will be invited into the union. Exactly what degree of either political or economic collaboration is intended was not made clear by Secretary Bevin. For in describing the projected

Western grouping as a parallel to the Soviet dominated bloc of police states in Eastern Europe, he was most careful to insist on the freedom of action to be maintained in the West. Bevin recognized, however, the necessity for cooperative economic reconstruction along lines already laid down by the Marshall plan. He indicated, in addition, that the union planned for Europe would also stretch through Africa, the Middle East and Far East, thus embracing the colonial empires of Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands.

WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION. This grandiose scheme will not be realized soon, if ever, in all its particulars. It has been received with more than usual agreement, however, between the major parties in Britain. And response on the continent, while mixed, has also been favorable. Swiss statesmen will perhaps be the last to agree to any change in that country's historic neutral position, and the Scandinavian reaction shows that the three

Northern countries of Europe will move with great caution toward any such open break with Russia as would be entailed in the new British-sponsored program. The Benelux countries and France have welcomed the plan with greatest enthusiasm. But the Anglo-French disagreement over financial policy that arose almost simultaneously with Bevin's statement came as a portent of the difficulties a Western union will later encounter. On January 24, René Mayer, French Finance Minister, announced that France would devalue the franc, although Sir Stafford Cripps, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, flew to Paris in an unsuccessful effort to dissuade French financial authorities from this course.

Britain's plan for Western unity can doubtless survive such hurdles as the immediate French financial crisis. What is more important in judging this new venture in British diplomacy is the attitude taken by Russia and the United States. Western unity in Europe, if extended also to overseas possessions of the nations involved, might lead to the creation of a formidable third bloc of states as strong economically and strategically as either Russia or the United States. Should this occur Moscow might find it advantageous to establish friendly relations with the new Western union in an effort to prevent its close association with Washington.

Fearing lest the union be directed solely against Russia, however, Moscow's immediate reaction to the Bevin proposal has been negative. TASS, the official Soviet news agency, has linked the idea of Western union with the ERP, and points out that Britain is thus fulfilling its part as a junior partner in what Russia's propagandists call United States economic imperialism. Moreover, Russia's negative attitude toward unity in Western Europe also stems from deep-seated antipathy to the Socialist, or near-Socialist, regimes which the union may eventually include.

It is not yet clear just how far the various Social Democratic parties in Western Europe have gone in planning closer cooperation to offset the attacks recently made on them by Communist sources, both within Russia and outside the Soviet Union, especially since the formation of the Cominform. Not only the leaders of the Labor party in Britain, but Socialists throughout Europe have been subjected to violent verbal assault in the past month or two by Communist spokesmen. In Britain, Labor cabinet

members have now responded in the most vigorous manner. Both Prime Minister Attlee and Herbert Morrison, his deputy, have on recent occasions spoken out bluntly against Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and have condemned totalitarianism as practiced in the Soviet orbit. Socialist leaders in Britain and France have at the same time conferred again about the possibility of strengthening the international ties of all Socialist parties. As yet no decision has been reported that indicates the Socialist International will be actively revived as a countermove to the Cominform. It is noteworthy, on the other hand, that the Socialist parties of Western Europe have endorsed the ERP; it remains to be seen whether they back the Bevin plan for Western unity.

WASHINGTON GIVES SUPPORT. Western European unity, as proposed by Bevin is not, at least officially, linked in any way with Socialist plans. Had Socialist cooperation and Western union been presented as coequal, Winston Churchill would hardly have given wholehearted support to the idea, although it is very similar to his own proposal made at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. It is doubtful also that the United States would heartily approve of Western union were it definitely urged as a method to foster socialism on the continent. Under-Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett on January 23 welcomed the Bevin plan as an additional means to aid Europe's recovery under the Marshall program. However, opinion at large in this country has not as yet fully faced up to the question of aiding Socialist governments in Europe. Secretary Marshall's statement in Britain, made on December 12, that the United States and Britain's Socialist government could work together in the ERP is on the record. But those segments of American opinion which do not distinguish between socialism and communism will find it difficult to accept Western unity, if based on Socialist cooperation, as they have found it difficult also to accept aid for individual Socialist governments. As the cleavage between Moscow and Washington grows wider, however, the United States will necessarily support defensive alliances in Western Europe and urge that the Marshall plan become the basis for economic cooperation among nations whose stability and strategic position are of vital interest to this country.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

NEW HEMISPHERE LABOR BODY ORGANIZED AT LIMA

The circumstances surrounding the launching of the Inter-American Federation of Labor (CIAT) in Lima on January 12 illustrate the ideological and political divisions that beset the labor movement throughout the Americas. The labor leaders gathered in the Peruvian capital for the express purpose

of capturing the Latin American trade union movement from the Communists. The new federation has arisen from the still smoking ashes of the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL), which for a variety of reasons can no longer claim to speak for organized labor in Latin America.

Organized in 1938, the CTAL was largely the creation of one man, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, former president of the Mexican Federation of Labor, who is described by his opponents as a Communist. The strength of the CTAL has resided in the national labor federations in Mexico, Cuba and Chile. In the past two years a bitter struggle has developed between Communists and non-Communists for control of the central body and its affiliates. Its consequence has been to split the organized trade union movement from top to bottom. The battle, moreover, was not contained within the movement. Latin American labor has had a history of political activity unknown to its counterpart in the United States, and it has been to the advantage of the national governments of Mexico, Cuba, Chile and Brazil to throw their active support to the moderate elements. The struggle has also been complicated by the intervention of the two rival American labor organizations. In interesting themselves in labor affairs below the border, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations have followed in the tradition of Samuel Gompers, who organized the short-lived Pan American Federation of Labor in 1918. The CIO has maintained a liaison with the CTAL since its inception. Much of the credit for arranging the Lima conference goes to the active Latin American representative of the AFL, Serafino Romualdi.

CIAT REPRESENTATION. The new Federation of Inter-American Labor was approved by delegates claiming to represent forty-five national unions in the United States, Cuba, Mexico, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile, as well as Puerto Rico and Surinam. The United States delegation from the AFL was also authorized to represent Canada and Panama. Present, but lacking authorization from their respective national federations to affiliate with the CIAT, were Dominican and Venezuelan representatives. The CIAT claims to represent twelve million workers, the majority of whom are American and Canadian. In the preindustrial, agrarian economy which still characterizes most of Latin America, the labor movement is only in its beginning, and today its leadership is badly divided. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the initiative in organizing the CIAT, as in the case of the CTAL before it, should come from the top rather than from the local bodies.

The first president of the Inter-American Federation of Labor will be Bernardo Ibáñez, the Socialist

Secretary-General of the Chilean Federation of Labor (not to be confused with the Communist-dominated organization of the same name). Ibáñez has had a stormy history both in his own country, where he was recently returned to official favor after the González government broke with the Communist party, and in the CTAL, where at the 1946 meeting in Mexico City he vainly attempted to swing that organization away from Toledano. The headquarters of the new labor movement will be located in Lima.

GOALS SET AT LIMA. Three objectives were enunciated in the CIAT's initial statement of principles: 1) to create a trade union movement free from "government tutelage or totalitarianism of any form"; 2) to strive for a higher standard of living for workers of the Americas; and 3) to promote "democratic inter-Americanism."

Pursuit of the first objective will obviously precipitate a showdown with the extreme Left and may require the CIAT to compromise with the Right. In its dispute for control of the trade union movement with the CTAL, the CIAT will be aided by government action which is driving Communists out of political and union offices in Chile, Brazil and Cuba. In Mexico, moreover, the Alemán government has withdrawn its favor from the CTAL president, Lombardo Toledano, and on January 8 Toledano's one-time associates in the Mexican Federation of Labor followed the government's lead by expelling him from the organization. By taking advantage of this situation, the new labor movement not only will associate itself with a policy which has repressive aspects, but also will incur obligations to government. In these countries, however, the tradition of a close association between labor and the administration is an old one.

The problem is particularly difficult as regards any attempt by the CIAT to gather Argentine workers into the organization. The Argentine labor movement is entirely government-controlled, and the Perón government would oppose any Latin American labor organization in which Argentina does not take the primary initiative. That the initial encouragement for the Inter-American Federation of Labor came from the AFL was, in any case, sufficient to damn the new organization in the eyes of the Argentine government, since the AFL was responsible for a critical report in 1946 on Argentine labor policy.

OLIVE HOLMES